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Abstract 
 The purpose of this report is to present and describe the events which occurred during the 
2012 pertussis outbreak in Douglas County, KS. Pertussis, commonly known as whooping 
cough, is a vaccine-preventable disease. The Lawrence-Douglas County Health Department 
investigated 305 reported cases and over 900 case contacts. Douglas County experienced the 
highest incidence in Kansas with a rate of 130.4/100,000 persons. 146 cases were deemed 
confirmed or probable. This report reviews the management of the disease in Douglas County, 
vaccination status of reported individuals, a cost estimation of preventative measures, and 
provides a summary of epidemiological events. Recommendations, based on CDC Public Health 
Preparedness Capability 13, are included for future outbreak events. These recommendations 
range from modification of the current reporting tool to encouraging a regular staff meeting. 
Introduction and Background 
 Pertussis, commonly referred to as 'whooping cough', is the one of the few remaining 
vaccine-preventable diseases still endemic in the United States (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2012). In 2012, the United States experienced an outbreak of pertussis with 
incidence rates not seen since pre-vaccination program years. Douglas County, located in 
northeastern Kansas just west of the Kansas City Metropolitan Area, experienced the second 
highest incidence rate of pertussis of all counties in Kansas (behind Johnson County). The 
outbreak continued into the first several weeks of 2013. 
 Forty-nine states reported increases in incidence in 2012.  The national incidence for 
2012 has been defined as 13.4/100,000 persons (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2013), the highest national incidence since 1955 (Schnirring, 2013). Kansas, along with nineteen 
  
2 
 
other states, exceeded this national incidence. Kansas investigated 1,912 reported cases in 2012. 
864 of these had laboratory or clinical confirmation resulting in a state incidence of 25.5/100,000 
persons (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2013). Figure 1 represents confirmed and 
probable case totals by county. The two darkest-shaded counties represent Douglas County and 
Johnson County. In the south, Sedgwick County is also identifiable. 
Figure 1: Confirmed and Probable Cases by County
 
 This historically significant outbreak of pertussis, combined with a modern electronic 
surveillance system, provides a unique opportunity to study the disease. The purpose of this 
report is to present the disease investigation and the epidemiological analysis of the 2012 
pertussis outbreak in Douglas County. Recommendations for future disease investigations by the 
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Lawrence-Douglas County Health Department (LDCHD) are included. This report, in part, 
satisfies the requirements for a Masters of Public Health degree from Kansas State University. 
 The Lawrence-Douglas County Health Department serves Douglas County, a population 
of 112,000 (United State's Census Bureau, 2013). Included in LDCHD's jurisdiction are the cities 
of Lawrence, Eudora, and Baldwin. The communicable disease staff of the health department, 
consisting of three public health nurses, investigated 305 reported cases of pertussis and over 900 
potential case contacts in 2012.  
 The etiologic agent of pertussis is the gram-negative bacteria Bordetella pertussis. An 
individual with pertussis presents with a persistent cough (> 2 weeks), minimal fever, and a 
characteristic 'whoop' sound upon inspiration after a coughing attack (paroxysms) (Kansas 
Department of Environment & Health, 2012) (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2013). Historically referred to as 'the hundred day cough', an individual may endure symptoms 
for 6 to 10 weeks. The disease progresses as displayed in Figure 2. An individual who acquires 
pertussis or is vaccinated against pertussis does not receive lifelong immunity. A 2005 study 
reported immunity from an infection to last between 4 and 20 years and immunity from 
vaccination to last between 4 and 12 years (Wendelboe, Van Rie, Salmaso, & Englund, 2005).  
 Pertussis is transmitted from person to person by aerosolized droplets (from coughing). 
The disease is not zoonotic; humans are the only known reservoir. Despite vaccination efforts, 
pertussis continues to remain endemic in the United States. Prevalence of pertussis has, for the 
most part, decreased in the United States since the introduction of the DTP vaccine. This trend is 
a result of improved hygiene, health practices, and vaccination. Reported incidence is highest 
among infants less than one year of age (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012). 
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Infants less than six months of age are not vaccinated and are at highest risk. The disease is 
generally transmitted by older family members (Tomovici, et al., 2012). 
The following products will be generated from the available data: 
-a summary of events which occurred during the outbreak, including a statistical 
breakdown, 
-a cost estimation of preventative measures for the outbreak, 
-vaccination percentage among the reported population, 
-a review of reporting methods, and 
-recommendations for future outbreak events. 
Figure 2: Retrieved from CDC.gov (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2013) 
 
Initiation of Investigation 
 No formal disease investigation was declared by either LDCHD or the Kansas 
Department of Health and Environment (KDHE) in 2012. Rather, the county and state health 
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departments continued standard operating procedure. The communicable disease staff 
investigated and reported cases according to normal procedures. A formal investigation of the 
events began on January 15, 2013. The investigation was initiated by the director of clinic 
services at LDCHD for the purposes of preparing an After Action Report. 
 The communicable disease staff was aware of an impending outbreak due to media 
coverage of pertussis events in other areas of the country. Johnson County, bordering Douglas 
County to the east, began seeing a significant spike in case load in mid-April 2012. Douglas 
county did not experience similar numbers until late August 2012. 
Investigative and Analytical Methods 
 The LDCHD communicable disease staff, consisting of three public health nurses, is 
responsible for investigating all cases of reportable disease in Douglas County. The county uses 
the state-run EpiTrax tool to report gathered information to the state surveillance system. KDHE 
aggregates all county data and reports this to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC). All interviews with cases are conducted over the phone. The staff completes the form in 
Attachment 1 for each case. The fields on this form represent the data available to the 
investigator for each patient. 
 Surveillance of pertussis can be complicated by various factors. An individual is typically 
most infectious during the catarrhal stage (Figure 1), where few symptoms are present (Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2013). The perceived severity and consequence of the 
disease can also hinder reporting. The surveillance system in Kansas is a passive one and 
generally relies on individuals to seek treatment. A physician then reports the case. An exception 
to this are school nurses who sometimes notify the local health department of potential cases. 
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 The communicable disease staff must assign a Case Status to each reported case. KDHE 
reviews the gathered data for each patient and assigns their own Case Status. For the purposes of 
this investigation, the KDHE Case Status is used. This was determined after a review of KDHE's 
Pertussis Investigation Guidelines and consultation with a state epidemiologist (Neises, 2013). 
 Cases are identified as 'Not a Case', 'Suspect', 'Probable', and 'Confirmed'. In summary, 
'Probable' cases are clinically confirmed while 'Confirmed' cases are confirmed by laboratory 
testing. Probable and confirmed cases are both reported to CDC, factored into incidence rates, 
and carry the same weight (Kansas Department of Environment & Health, 2012). Attachment 3 
contains an excerpt from KDHE's Pertussis Investigation Guidelines with a more thorough 
description of  each Case Status. 
 The last data pull for information included in this report was February 6, 2013. This 
allowed adequate time for investigations of cases reported in 2012 to be completed. Prior to the 
investigation, a thorough literature review of investigation guidelines at the local, state, and 
federal levels was completed. Included in the literature review were previous outbreak reports 
produced by academia and government organizations. In addition, participating parties were 
contacted and interviewed. State and local epidemiologists were interviewed and also assisted in 
data collection and feedback. Only cases reported in 2012 are included. Access to EpiTrax was 
granted under supervision of a LDCHD employee.  
 Cost estimation was conducted and adjusted for inflation to 2012 levels. Assessment of 
reporting methods and management of the investigations was addressed through a hotwash (a 
meeting with the purpose of evaluation) with the communicable disease staff on January 29, 
2013. The CDC Public Health Preparedness Capability 13: Public Health Surveillance and 
  
7 
 
Epidemiological Investigation was used to assist in evaluation (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2011). Internal documents were reviewed to determine if requirements were met. 
Various staff members were consulted as well. Completion of the CDC assessment is valuable 
for the health department and can be used for accreditation. A participant feedback form 
(Attachment 4) was distributed prior to the meeting. The data obtained from EpiTrax was 
downloaded as a .csv file and opened in Microsoft Office Excel 2007. In Excel, sorting, 
aggregating, and filtering of the data was conducted as necessary. Any cases falling out of the 
Douglas County jurisdiction were removed from the study. 
 Statistical tools used in this paper include IBM's SPSS and Microsoft Office Excel 2007 
with the Data Analysis add-on.  
Results 
Summary of Epidemiological Events:  
 Of the 305 investigated cases in Douglas County, 146 were confirmed or probable. This 
results in a calculated county incidence rate of 130.4/100,000 persons. The state and county were 
unable to provide historical data for the county beyond 2011 which included both confirmed and 
probable cases. The CDC was not contacted for this data. To give some understanding of the 
expected caseload for 2012, internal records reveal that eighteen cases (9 confirmed, 9 probable) 
were identified in 2011. Prior to that, no known After Action Report or media event documents 
an outbreak of pertussis in Douglas County in the past decade. 
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Figure 3: Epidemiologic Curve for Outbreak 
 
 Sporadic cases occurring in the first six months of 2012 suggest that B. pertussis was 
circulating in the community and region prior to the outbreak designation. One school outbreak 
of pertussis was officially identified by KDHE. Baldwin City experienced the first cluster of 
pertussis. A cluster of cases occurred at a youth summer camp in July. In October, Baldwin City 
experienced a rash of cases across the school district. A review of patient data reveals contacts 
occurred between the cases. All cases occurred within 42 days of each other. The event ranged 
from October 12 to November 5 when the last cases were reported. The Baldwin City School 
District event included eight confirmed or probable cases and 34 patient contacts. All confirmed 
and probable cases were among individuals who were up-to-date on their vaccinations. 
 The outbreak officially designated by KDHE occurred at a Lawrence private school. The 
suspected index case of this event is a teacher who was not up-to-date on vaccination. Cough 
onset was reported in mid-October. The teacher was not reported until early November. A 
student was also reported in early November with a cough onset of two weeks prior. Both the 
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student and the teacher continued to attend school. The last reported case was in early December. 
Transmission occurred in the classroom. Students in the class continued to spread the disease to 
siblings and other contacts. Five confirmed and probable cases were connected with this 
outbreak. Eight additional contacts were associated.  
 Outbreaks where spread was limited to family members and one household were 
categorized as household outbreaks. These events are likely to be common as transmission risk 
in households can be as high as 80%. Several factors affect transmission rates including 
vaccination status, type of contact, age, and preventative treatment (Guris, 2000). Ten (10) 
household outbreaks were identified when reviewing cases. These identified outbreaks include 
23 confirmed or probable cases and 2 suspect cases. In addition, 162 contacts were identified in 
correlation with household outbreaks. 110 of these contacts are connected to two cases who 
worked as healthcare workers. No documented spread resulted from their work contacts. Of the 
23 confirmed or probable cases, 15 were up-to-date on pertussis vaccinations--a vaccination 
percentage of 65.21% among infected individuals associated with household outbreaks. An 
accurate calculation of the attack rate among households is not possible as the total number of 
individuals in each household is not recorded. 
 Table 1 displays the frequency distribution of pertussis among age groups in Douglas 
County during the 2012 outbreak. To protect privacy of patients, values less than six are masked. 
Figure 4 is a map of all reported cases in Douglas County. Cases are randomly offset on the x 
and y axis to protect patient identity. Clusters are consistent with large population centers (cities 
and towns). 
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Table 1: Frequency Distribution by Age Group 
Age Group Confirmed and Probable Cases All Reported Cases Proportion 
0-4 years 27 70 .386 
5-9 years 34 81 .420 
10-14 years 36 62 .581 
15-19 years 10 22 .455 
20-24 years N/A 11 N/A 
25-29 years N/A N/A N/A 
30-34 years 6 8 .750 
35-39 years 8 9 .889 
40-44 years N/A 7 N/A 
45-49 years N/A N/A N/A 
50-54 years N/A N/A N/A 
55-59 years N/A N/A N/A 
60-64 years N/A N/A N/A 
65-69 years N/A N/A N/A 
70-74 years 0 N/A 0 
75-79 years N/A N/A 0 
80-84 years N/A N/A N/A 
85+ years N/A N/A N/A 
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Figure 4: Reported Cases in Douglas County 
 
Management of the Outbreak by LDCHD 
 The participant feedback form distributed to the communicable disease staff (Attachment 
4) was returned by 50% of participants (two). The goal of 'reducing the spread of disease' was 
identified. Participants did not believe this goal was achieved. Participants believed that their 
contribution to the exercise was appropriate for their position. Participants also believe that the 
incident allowed for proper demonstration of the department's disease investigation capabilities. 
A greater diversity of disciplines (e.g. analysts) could have been included. Participant responses 
are summarized in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Summary of Participant Feedback Survey 
Strengths 1) Quick initiation of cases 
2) Thorough initial investigation 
3) Flexibility of staff 
4) Strong working relationship with KDHE and school 
nurses 
Weaknesses 1) Follow-up in a timely manner 
2) Consistent follow-up on uncertain cases 
3) Lack of regular meetings (no formal declaration of ICS) 
Notes to the evaluator 
(Observations possibly not 
recorded) 
1) Consistency/bias of interviewers regarding importance 
of investigations and follow-up 
2) Inadequate staff 
3) Improper training 
4) Physician response early in the outbreak 
Suggested Improvements 1) Increase staff cross training 
2) Improve consistency in charting 
3) Use DIGs more accurately 
4) Have back-up CD nurses 
5) Routine training 
Resources needing reviewed, 
revised, or developed 
1) Add more individuals who can access EpiTrax 
2) Train additional nurses for CD team 
3) Consider training reviews 
Additional Comments 1) Training during an incident is not as effective as 
training prior to an incident 
2) The headsets were a nice addition. 
 
 During the hotwash on January 29, 2013, the events of the outbreak were reviewed. 
Notes are available in Attachment 5. There was consensus that staff shortage was an important 
issue and the caseload exceeded expectations. One explanation for the caseload is that all 
reported cases required investigation, even those with negative laboratory tests (Kansas 
Department of Environment & Health, 2012). A trigger point was never officially identified in 
Douglas County. The Incident Command System was never activated (Colson, 2013) 
 The communicable disease staff understood that pertussis would impact Douglas County. 
Johnson County was experiencing a large case load earlier in the year. To preempt the outbreak, 
the staff reviewed the disease investigation guidelines outlined by KDHE. A triaging flowchart 
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was provided for high priority cases and contacts (Kansas Department of Health and 
Environment, 2012). High priority individuals were defined as pregnant women, babies less than 
one year of age, and un-immunized and under-immunized persons. A meeting was held with 
school nurses prior to the school year. The school nurses were encouraged to review staff and 
student vaccination records. 
 The staff does not meet regularly due to a heavy workload. Two nurses spent the majority 
of October through December conducting communicable disease investigations. This resulted in 
a significant strain on resources (Colson, 2013). The responsibility of disease investigation is 
rotated among the nurses while other staff generally attend to clinic duties. 
 Interns and other clinic nurses were used at times to assist in follow-up interviews with 
patients. Due to the case definitions of pertussis, follow-up interviews were necessary for many 
cases to determine if the patient had been coughing for over two weeks. The current system for 
tracking cases consists of a binder with various sections. One section is for new cases which still 
need to be contacted and another is for cases requiring follow-up. Priority is given to contacting 
cases within 24 hours of being reported to LDCHD. The staff achieved this performance measure 
93.8% of the time
1
. Measuring follow-up proved more difficult. Due to the different 
circumstances surrounding individual cases, follow-up is not always required. It was noted 
during the hotwash that follow-up required attention. A review of some longer case 
investigations confirms this; 35 investigations (11.5% ) took 20 days or longer to complete. The 
mean case investigation length for 2012 was 8 days, the median was 7 days (range: 0 to 42). No 
performance measure exists for case investigation duration. 
                                                          
1
 'Date of Interview' - 'Date Reported to LHD' 
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 CDC's public health preparedness capability 13 was determined an appropriate evaluation 
tool for the management of the pertussis outbreak. The complete tables and forms completed for 
this exercise can be viewed in Attachment 2. These evaluations typically rely on the Incident 
Command System. One can establish a baseline and measure progress with such reviews. 
Recently, measurement and public health have received much publicity from the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation (Gates, 2013).  
 Some performance measures applied only at the state level and were not applicable to this 
evaluation. These are indicated in the tables of Attachment 2. With the 24/7 reportable disease 
hotline, it is a rarity that local health departments receive cases prior to KDHE. Several of the 
Resource Elements and Tasks require "written plans". While LDCHD may be doing several of 
these actions, written plans may not exist. This can be an issue when staff turnover occurs. The 
lack of these plans accounts for several 'incompletes'. Under Function 3, Task 3 was assigned a 
partial completion due to the inconsistencies with follow-up  mitigation throughout the outbreak. 
Task 4.1 was assigned a partial completion due to the lack of communicable disease team 
meetings during the event. While major issues were addressed, they were with KDHE and not 
documented. While it is standard practice in the health department to prepare After Action 
Reports, detailed guidelines as to their contents are not available. No established time frame is 
available for when action should be taken on recommendations (Function 4, Planning Resource 
Element 1). A cumulative score was not assigned to the health department, nor would the 
evaluator be confident assigning one. Rather, specific areas which might benefit from review 
were highlighted. 
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Vaccination Status 
 Of the 305 investigated cases, 71.8% were reported as vaccinated. 15.7% were not 
vaccinated or had an unknown vaccination history. The remaining 14.3% were left with a blank 
vaccination field. The unknown and blank vaccinations fields cannot be interpreted and are 
removed from the sampling. Using Fielding et al.'s methods of determining vaccine efficacy ((1-
odds ratio) where odds ratio is: vaccine rates of actual cases divided by vaccine rates of 
uninfected) TDaP and DTaP vaccine efficacy for Douglas County was estimated at 16% 
(Effectiveness of seasonal influenza vaccine against pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, Australia, 
2010., 2011). Significance was not determined. What is unique with this method is that only 
those who sought treatment were included. This is likely to have skewed the vaccine efficacy 
rate. Recent articles on acellular pertussis vaccination have reported high efficacy rates (greater 
than 90%) of the vaccine (Ward, et al., 2005). 
 No significant correlation between gender and either the likelihood of being reported or 
the likelihood of being diagnosed exists  in the obtained data. There was no significant difference 
between the vaccinated and unvaccinated group mean-age. Sample size was not large enough to 
determine differences in race. 
Cost Analysis 
 An estimated cost of case and preventative treatment associated with the outbreak is 
$12,189. This is based off of the raw cost (total cost absorbed by both the patient and insurance) 
of a 5-day 500 mg azithromycin regiment
2
, multiplied by the number of patients (251) and 
contacts (331) who were reported as receiving preventative antibiotic treatment. In addition, 29 
patients received a second round of antibiotics. An additional 143 contacts were encouraged to 
receive treatment and are not included. Vaccination cost is not included as there is no efficient 
                                                          
2
 Obtained from Lawrence pharmacies. Total cost to patient/insurance for z-pack. 
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method to aggregate the cases and contacts who received a TDaP for prevention. No additional 
vaccines or emergency shipments were required for the county. The cost of PCR laboratory 
testing is estimated at $16,555 (Hart, 2013). The cost of surveillance and man-hours from 
LDCHD dedicated to pertussis is estimated at $13,365
3
. The total estimated cost for additional 
public health surveillance, testing and prevention for the outbreak in Douglas County is $42,110. 
Costs of cultures and serologic assays are negligible
4
. A 2005 study  of 2,518 hospital 
admissions of patients with pertussis in the U.S. revealed a mean cost of $9,130 (median $4,600, 
range $520 – $507,697) per person/per stay (O'Brien & Caro, 2005). Reported in 2002 U.S. 
dollars, when adjusted for inflation this amounts to a mean of $11,652 (median $5,870) in 2012
5
. 
In Douglas County, six individuals were hospitalized though only two were deemed to be 
probable pertussis cases. 
Limitations of the Study 
 Recently, surveillance systems similar to the one described in this report have been 
questioned as valid data sources for research (Herrett, Thomas, Schoonen, Smeeth, & Hall, 
2009). In an effort to ensure the validity of data from health administration systems, guidelines 
similar to STROBE, are being prepared (Setting the record straight: developing a guideline for 
the reporting of studies conducted using observational routinely collected data, 2013).  STROBE 
guidelines are criteria and standards used for epidemiological research. The EpiTrax system is 
primarily meant to deliver the required information to the CDC. All other fields are 
supplementary. 
                                                          
3
 Estimated 495 hours multiplied by the average hourly wage of the communicable disease staff 
4
 Only two cultures and serologic assays were run on cases. 
5
 http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm 
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 A review of the data revealed many inconsistencies in data entry. This study also relies 
on those with pertussis to see a physician. It is likely that several cases in Douglas County 
remain undiagnosed and unreported. 
Conclusion/Discussion 
 From Figure 3, the outbreak began in July as an increasing number of cases were 
reported. These sporadic cases were enough to keep pertussis circulating in the community until 
the school year began in which the surge in caseload really began. Pertussis spreads primarily in 
institutional settings such as schools (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2013). 
 Inconsistencies in data entry severely limited the validity of the data. The sample size for 
vaccination status was greatly reduced due to a number of blank fields. One must remember that 
the primary purpose of this database is for surveillance and not for research purposes. 
 Origins of the outbreak are unknown. It is likely the disease was endemic in the 
community prior to 2012. The high incidence of pertussis in 2012 is considered unusual. Risk 
factors which might explain larger outbreaks are being explored by academia and the CDC alike. 
 Several potential reasons exist for the increased incidence in pertussis. The CDC is 
currently investigating a number of leads (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2013). 
One possible reason is that surveillance activities and awareness of pertussis have improved 
leading to a more accurate diagnosis of existing cases. Vaccination rates are often cited as a 
reason for the outbreak (Salzberg, 2012). Current vaccination rates have not been identified as 
the cause by the CDC at this time. DTaP, the pertussis vaccine for children, has been incorrectly 
associated with autism, SIDS, and other developmental disorders (National Research Council, 
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2003). In early 2013, vaccine resistant strains of B. pertussis were isolated in the United States 
(Schnirring, 2013). This will continue to be investigated in ongoing outbreaks. 
 Research has been done on the long term efficacy of the TDaP and DTaP vaccines. A 
2012 article reports that each year after vaccination is associated with in decreased efficacy of 
the vaccination and increased odds of contracting pertussis (Misegades, et al.). Children receive 
the last DTaP shot between their fourth and sixth birthdays. Consistent with this research, Table 
1 reveals that the highest proportion of infected individuals to reported cases comes from those 
aged 10-14. KDHE school vaccination requirements require a student to receive a TDaP between 
grades 7 and 10 (Kansas Department of Health and Environment, 2012). Despite this, 
vaccination is still encouraged and 'remains highly effective' (Shapiro, 2013). Examining this age 
group in future studies might indicate the benefice of an earlier TDaP booster. As of March 
2011, the federal Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices had not released guidelines for 
the recommended frequency of TDaP boosters in adolescents and adults (California Department 
of Public Health, 2011). Further queries returned no updates regarding these recommendations. 
Recommendations for future disease surveillance activities 
 Attachment 2 includes select tables from the After Action Report and analysis of CDC 
defined Public Health Preparedness Capabilities. In this section,  only the final proposed 
recommendations are provided from the analysis of Capability 13 and information gathered 
during the outbreak investigation are provided. The reader is encouraged to review Attachment 2 
for further information. These recommendations should be read with the understanding that the 
author is still a candidate for a MPH. 
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 One might assume that large scale disease outbreaks are a rarity in Douglas County. 
From 2003-2012, three infectious disease outbreaks have occurred which require community 
intervention. In 2003, a cryptosporidiosis outbreak occurred. In 2006, a mumps outbreak at the 
University of Kansas occurred. The most recent outbreak to occur is the 2012 Pertussis outbreak. 
Events like these have occurred in the past and can be expected to occur in the future. 
Table 3: Recommendations Overview 
Capability Function/Task # Recommendation 
Resource 
Element 
Primary 
Responsible 
Agency 
Public Health 
Surveillance and 
Epidemiological 
Investigation 
(#13) 
1 Generate Media and 
external document 
reporting guidelines 
similar to KDHE 
Planning LDCHD 
Public Health 
Surveillance and 
Epidemiological 
Investigation 
(#13) 
1 Review data reporting 
requirements 
Standardized Data 
Entry (Measure 1) 
Planning LDCHD/KDHE 
Public Health 
Surveillance and 
Epidemiological 
Investigation 
(#13) 
3 Written plans for 
analyzing data 
(Planning Resource 
Element 3).  
Planning LDCHD 
Public Health 
Surveillance and 
Epidemiological 
Investigation 
(#13) 
3.3 Improved 
Organizational 
Structure to Track 
Follow-Up Cases 
Equipment 
and 
Technology 
LDCHD 
Public Health 
Surveillance and 
Epidemiological 
Investigation 
(#13) 
3 EpiTrax 
Training/Review 
Staff and 
Training 
KDHE/LDCHD 
Public Health 
Surveillance and 
Epidemiological 
4.1 Regular 
Communicable 
Staff and 
Training 
LDCHD 
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Capability Function/Task # Recommendation 
Resource 
Element 
Primary 
Responsible 
Agency 
Investigation 
(#13) 
Disease Meeting 
 
Standardized Data Entry (Priority) 
 Standardized data entry among case investigators is a priority recommendation. The 
recommendation was encouraged through participant surveys, the hotwash, and through the 
evaluator's analysis of data. Capability 13 stresses accurate collection of data. To demonstrate the 
need for standardized data entry at the Lawrence-Douglas County Health Department, consider 
the following inconsistencies. Of 140 school-aged children (6-17), 112 were recorded as being 
associated with a school. The vaccination status field was left blank for  14.3% of all investigated 
cases. The patient reporting agency field was only filled out in 45 instances (14.75%) leaving 
insufficient data for auditing purposes. The cities of Baldwin City, Lawrence, and Lecompton 
were each identified in at least two different ways. Blanks are not appropriate responses for 
fields as they cannot be interpreted. 
 The United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) encourages 
standardization of both data entry and data gathering (ways in which questions are asked) 
(Wallace & Brunson, 2009). Standardizing data would greatly improve the quality of the data 
collected on reportable diseases. For all businesses, efficiency can be improved with proper data 
management and reporting techniques (talend, 2012). This recommendation is not specific for 
pertussis but for all communicable disease and clinic work conducted at LDCHD. This process 
would make the data more valuable and useable by other groups, health entities, and researchers. 
Data can be more easily aggregated, sorted, and analyzed when properly formatted. A more 
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complete data set would also help to measure vaccination status in the community. The use of 
communicable disease data is one way in which LDCHD can prepare sub-county level data sets. 
 Methods exist to identify and solve some of these issues. Data is gathered by staff via 
telephone interviews. Telephone interviews are an efficient method of gathering data. Routine 
staff training should address how data is entered (talend, 2012) (Wallace & Brunson, 2009). Self-
populating fields or drop down lists would also help to reduce disparity and error. Commonly 
entered values should be identified the same way by all parties. Fields should be reviewed so that 
there is no potential for confusion.  Reducing the number of investigators is another, less 
practical, option. Another option supported by HHS would be performance reviews (Wallace & 
Brunson, 2009). With EpiTrax, it is possible to identify which investigator is responsible for 
which case. A pattern in data entry errors could be recognized through this method. 
Improved Organizational Structure to Track Follow-up Cases 
 At the Lawrence-Douglas County Health Department, cases are currently managed using 
a binder with various sections. Priority is given to newly reported cases which still need to be 
contacted. Behind the new reported cases exists a follow-up section. These are cases which 
require a follow-up interview due to a variety of circumstances. The patients may not have been 
available for an interview earlier or perhaps they did not meet the clinical case definition (> 2 
weeks coughing) at the time of the initial interview.  The mean case investigation length for 2012 
was 8 days, the median was 7 days. The nearness of the mean and median indicate that there 
were few extreme outliers. 
 No performance measure exists for case investigation duration. Due to the different 
circumstances surrounding individual cases, investigation length is expected to vary. Despite 
this, a more efficient method for tracking follow-up status should be adopted. While a rarity, 
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investigations dating back to June, July, and September have yet to be concluded in EpiTrax. 
Thirty-five (11.5%) of investigations took 20 days or longer to complete. 
 A simple list in Excel allows one to sort entries based on the last day contacted. 
Investigators can set up reminders in EpiTrax or sort based on investigation status to assist. More 
frequent review of cases would also help to improve follow-up. 
Modification and Training for EpiTrax 
 With the advances in technology and reporting, we are able to manage more data and 
quickly identify disease. The addition or modification of fields in EpiTrax (Attachment 1) would 
help to identify areas of potential transmission. This type of information is important for a 
disease such as pertussis as it has high transmission rates in institutional settings. Currently, 
fields leave much to interpretation of the investigator. When three different investigators are 
entering data it can be problematic when attempting to find correlations. A 2011 AAR on 
pertussis clusters highlighted the fact that EpiTrax was still being adapted by the communicable 
disease staff (Grubbs, 2011).  
 Currently the form has an exposed setting field. The intention was that schools, 
workplace, or other possible places of exposure be selected here and then entered in a self-
populating 'exposed setting specific' field. Unfortunately, lack of training with the EpiTrax tool 
for local health departments has led to varied interpretation on how this field is used. Staffing 
issues at KDHE has limited the ability to provide training. One case in Douglas County had this 
field filled out appropriately. Proper training from KDHE may alleviate this concern and satisfy 
this recommendation. 
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Regular Communicable Disease Meeting 
 With three investigators covering a surge in caseload, a regular communicable disease 
meeting would be beneficial to address issues during the incident. Including a medical 
investigator from KDHE via tele-conference during times of outbreak would provide another 
resource as well. Addressed in the hotwash, this would allow time for investigators to share 
observations regarding specific events. Such meetings could also help staff to identify potential 
areas of high incidence. KDHE follows a similar model among epidemiologists and meets for a 
short while each day to review cases. This method allows each epidemiologist to be familiar with 
current investigations. Unless a group or one individual regularly reviews all cases, it is difficult 
to assess the outbreak at a larger scale. During the pertussis outbreak, the staff did not meet 
regularly and treated the caseload like a typical event. Events need to be reviewed as a group or 
by one individual to properly assess what is occurring in the community. 
 Time may be an issue at LDCHD. The communicable disease staff is also responsible for 
staffing the clinic. When caseloads are high and the clinic is busy it can be very difficult to find a 
time to meet. Despite this, the staff is encouraged to be creative. The current meeting time is 8:30 
in the morning on a Tuesday. An in-person meeting may not be necessary . An accurate 
summarization of each investigator's work via writing or voice recording may be sufficient. 
 In addition to regular meetings, establishment of the incident command system early in 
the outbreak would benefit the outbreak management and investigation. From an AAR report 
prepared in 2006 over a mumps outbreak managed by LDCHD and Watkin's Health Center: 
  
24 
 
 "An important lesson learned was that [the ICS] team was very valuable and need 
to be established earlier in the outbreak." (Kansas Department of Health and 
Environment, 2006, p. 11) 
The ICS can be modified to apply to various events and scales. It provides accountability to 
participants and can assist with planning stages and allocations of resources. 
 Cross-Training of Staff 
 The Lawrence-Douglas County Health Department currently employs public health 
nurses that are not associated with the communicable disease team. In the hotwash, the 
possibility of cross-training these staff members was addressed. These staff members could assist 
in managing the case load during slow clinic hours. Additional staff would be used to manage 
follow-up interviews. Cross-training of staff is recommended given that data entry procedures 
are standardized among the staff. However, additional investigators run the risk of introducing 
more disparity in the data set. 
 Due to recent changes in investigation guidelines, this recommendation is not a priority. 
Caseload is unlikely to approach outbreak levels in the near future. It is advisable to have a plan 
in place should incidence of any disease increase dramatically again. From the hotwash and 
participant surveys, having back-up CD nurses prepared will assist during times of high case 
load.  
Potential for future research 
 The author of this paper has been communicating with KDHE and Dr. Raghavan of KSU 
and intends to pursue future research on this pertussis outbreak in Kansas. The parties will 
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conduct spatial and temporal analysis of pertussis cases across the state. The intent is to produce 
a publishable paper which will assist in advancing knowledge on the epidemiology of pertussis. 
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Attachment 2: Preparedness Capability 13 Review 
This section of the report reviews the performance of the Public Health and Healthcare Preparedness 
Capabilities demonstrated during this incident. In this section, observations are organized by Capability, 
associated Functions and Tasks, and Performance Measures if available. Resource Elements for each function 
are also evaluated. Each Function is followed by related observations, which include supporting documentation, 
analysis, and recommendations. 
 
PREPAREDNESS CAPABILITY: CAPABILITY 13 - PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE AND 
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION 
Capability Description: Public health surveillance and epidemiological investigation is the ability to create, 
maintain, support, and strengthen routine surveillance and detection systems and epidemiological investigation 
processes, as well as to expand these systems and processes in response to incidents of public health 
significance. 
 
The hierarchy of CDC capabilities are as follows: 
Capability 
 Functions 
  Tasks 
  Performance Measures 
 Resource Elements 
  Planning Resource Elements 
  Skills and Training Resource Elements 
Equipment and Technology Resource Elements 
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Function 1: Conduct public health surveillance and detection 
Function Description: Conduct ongoing systematic collection, analysis, interpretation, and management of public health-related data 
to verify a threat or incident of public health concern, and to characterize and manage it effectively through all phases of the incident. 
Task/Observation Keys Status/Task Completed 
1 Engage and retain stakeholders, which are defined by the jurisdiction, who can provide 
health data to support routine surveillance, including daily activities outside of an incident, 
and to support response to an identified public health threat or incident. 
Fully  Partially  Not  N/A  
2 Conduct routine and incident-specific morbidity and mortality surveillance as indicated by 
the situation (e.g., complications of chronic disease, injury, or pregnancy) using inputs such 
as reportable disease surveillance, vital statistics, syndromic surveillance, hospital 
discharge abstracts, population-based surveys, disease registries, and active case finding. 
(For additional or supporting detail, see Capability 6: Information Sharing) 
Fully  Partially  Not  N/A  
3 Provide statistical data and reports to public health and other applicable jurisdictional 
leadership in order to identify potential populations at-risk for adverse health outcomes 
during a natural or man-made threat or incident. 
Fully  Partially  Not  N/A  
4 Maintain surveillance systems that can identify health problems, threats, and 
environmental hazards and receive and respond to (or investigate) reports 24/7. (For 
additional or supporting detail, see Capability 6: Information Sharing) 
Fully  Partially  Not  N/A  
Performance Measure: Proportion of reports of selected reportable diseases received by a 
public health agency within the jurisdiction required time frame 
N/A* 
Numerator:  
Denominator:  
Status of Function 1 based on the assessments of the associated Tasks: 
 Infrastructure  Fully in Place -- Fully Evaluated and Demonstrated 
 Infrastructure  Fully in Place --Not Fully Evaluated and Demonstrated  
 Infrastructure Not Fully in Place 
 No Infrastructure in Place 
*Unable to accurately calculate. Due to methods of reporting, no consistent entries exist to determine this measure. Applicable to KDHE, not local 
health departments. 
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Function 1: Conduct public health surveillance and detection 
Function Description: Conduct ongoing systematic collection, analysis, interpretation, and management of public health-related data 
to verify a threat or incident of public health concern, and to characterize and manage it effectively through all phases of the incident. 
Planning Resource Elements Requirements met 
P1: (Priority) Written plans should document the legal and 
procedural framework that supports mandated and voluntary  
information exchange with a wide variety of community partners, 
including those serving communities of color and tribes. 
 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
Note: State regulations require reportable diseases be 
reported to the health department. Voluntary information 
exchange exists between school nurses and the health 
department.  
P2: (Priority) Written plans should include processes and protocols 
for accessing health information that follow jurisdictional  
and federal laws and that protect personal health information via 
instituting security and confidentiality policies. 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
Note: Internal HIPAA policies in accordance with state and 
federal HIPAA regulations address this. 
 
P3: (Priority) Written plans should include processes and protocols 
to gather and analyze data... 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
 
Note: Data is gathered and analyzed by the CD team. A 
Communicable disease table is complied monthly for the 
county. No written plans address this but it has become 
routine practice. 
P4: (Priority) Written plans should include procedures to ensure 
24/7 health department access (e.g., designated phone line or 
contact person in place to receive reports) to collect, review, and 
respond to reports of potential health threats 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
 
Note: KDHE 24/7 reporting line is available. 
P5: (Priority) Written plans should include processes and protocols 
to notify CDC of cases on the Nationally Notifiable Infectious Disease 
List within the time frame identified on the list, including immediate 
notification when indicated. Electronic exchange of personal health 
information should meet applicable patient privacy-related laws and 
standards, including state or territorial laws. These include the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, and standards 
from the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the 
Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology 
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.  Plans should 
include procedures to move to electronic case notification using 
CDC’s Public Health Information Network Case Notification Message 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
 
Note: KDHE is responsible for reporting to CDC. 
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Mapping Guides. 
P6: Written plans should include a process to conduct surveillance if 
the primary notifiable surveillance system (i.e., electronic system) is 
disrupted during an incident.  The process should describe not only 
electronic back-ups, but also how surveillance will be conducted if no 
electricity or electronic infrastructure is available or in place. 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
 
Note: Paper forms are available. Surveillance is dependent on 
reporting from physicians and laboratories. Emergency 
communication guidelines exist. 
 
Skills and Training Resource Elements  
S1: (Priority) Public health staff conducting data collection, analysis, 
and reporting in support of surveillance and epidemiologic 
investigations should achieve, at a minimum, the Tier 1 
Competencies and Skills for Applied Epidemiologists in 
Governmental Public Health Agencies. 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
Note: Epidemiology staff consists of public health nurses. 
Previous AARs and epidemiologic investigations satisfy these 
competencies. 
 
Equipment and Technology Resource Elements  
E1: (Priority) Have or have access to health information infrastructure 
and surveillance systems that are able to accept, process, analyze, 
and share data for surveillance and epidemiological investigation 
activities. 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
Note: EpiTrax, reportable disease regulations, school nurses, 
KDHE, etc. 
E2: Have or have access to a system compatible with the National 
Electronic Disease Surveillance System. 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
 
Note: EpiTrax 
 
E3: Have or have access to equipment that may be necessary to 
ensure the electronic management and exchange of information 
(e.g., laboratory test orders, samples, and results) with hospitals, 
doctor’s offices, community health centers, and poison control 
centers 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A 
 
Note: EpiTrax, email 
 
 
  
                 Attachment 2 
34 
 
Function 1: Conduct public health surveillance and detection 
Function Description: Conduct ongoing systematic collection, analysis, interpretation, and management of public health-related data 
to verify a threat or incident of public health concern, and to characterize and manage it effectively through all phases of the incident. 
Analysis 
Strengths 
- A good working relationship with KDHE and school nurses allows the county surveillance system to function appropriately. (Task 1) 
- Access to EpiTrax addresses numerous reporting needs. 
Areas for Improvement 
- Privacy guidelines currently do not exist for reporting to the media and external parties. Examples of this would be KDHE's reporting 
guidelines where the numerator must be greater than 5 and the denominator must be greater than 10,000. 
- The performance measure requires another reported field in order to accurately calculate. (Performance Measure 1) 
- Written plans for analyzing data do not exist (Planning Resource Element 3). While this is currently accomplished on a regular basis, 
in the event of staff turnover continuation of analytics could prove problematic. 
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Function 2: Conduct public health and epidemiological investigations 
Function Description: Identify the source of a case or outbreak of disease, injury, or exposure and its determinants in a population 
(e.g., time, place, person, disability status, living status, or other indices) to coordinate and report the summary results of the analysis 
to jurisdictional and federal partners, as appropriate. 
Task/Observation Keys Status/Task Completed 
1 Conduct investigations of disease, injury or exposure in response to natural or man-made 
threats or incidents and ensure coordination of investigation with jurisdictional partner 
agencies. Partners include law enforcement, environmental health practitioners, public 
health nurses, maternal and child health, and other regulatory agencies if illegal activity is  
suspected. 
Fully  Partially  Not  N/A  
2 Provide epidemiological and environmental public health consultation, technical 
assistance, and information to local health departments regarding disease, injury, or 
exposure and methods of surveillance, investigation, and response. 
Fully  Partially  Not  N/A  
3 Report investigation results to jurisdictional and federal partners, as appropriate. (For 
additional or supporting detail, see Capability 6: Information Sharing) 
Fully  Partially  Not  N/A  
Performance Measure: Percentage of infectious disease outbreak investigation reports that 
contain all minimal elements* 
– Numerator: Number of infectious disease outbreak investigation reports generated 
containing all minimal elements 
– Denominator: Total number of infectious disease outbreak investigation reports 
generated 
 
* 'All minimal elements' interpreted as being accepted by KDHE. 
100% 
Numerator: 305 
Denominator: 305 
Status of Function 2 based on the assessments of the associated Tasks: 
 Infrastructure  Fully in Place -- Fully Evaluated and Demonstrated 
 Infrastructure  Fully in Place --Not Fully Evaluated and Demonstrated  
 Infrastructure Not Fully in Place 
 No Infrastructure in Place 
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Function 2: Conduct public health and epidemiological investigations 
Function Description: Identify the source of a case or outbreak of disease, injury, or exposure and its determinants in a population 
(e.g., time, place, person, disability status, living status, or other indices) to coordinate and report the summary results of the analysis to  
jurisdictional and federal partners, as appropriate. 
Planning Resource Elements Requirements met 
P1: (Priority) Written plans should include investigation report 
templates that [contain... minimal] elements. 
 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
Note: Available in physical form and through EpiTrax. 
P2: Written plans should include processes for how and when the 
jurisdiction will conduct investigations of health incidents (e.g., 
infectious disease outbreaks, injuries, and other incidents) and 
environmental public health hazards.  Depending on the 
investigation, a plan will include at minimum the following 
information: 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
Note: KDHE's reporting guidelines for disease and injury are 
established and followed. Internal documents are maintained. 
 
P3: Written plans should include processes and protocols for 
conducting investigations in coordination with other governmental 
agencies, key stakeholders, and organizations that support 
populations at-risk for adverse health outcomes 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
Note: Available through the Douglas County Bio Incident 
Annex - 2012 and Disease Containment SOG. 
 
P4: Written plans should include memoranda of understanding or 
other letters of agreement authorizing joint investigations  
and exchange of epidemiological information with law enforcement 
and other agencies, as well as defined roles for each participating 
agency. 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
Note: Available through Douglas Counties Disease 
Containment Plan. 
 
P5: Written plans should include a procedure to ensure that 
jurisdictional public health departments are provided a uniform  
set of jurisdictional health-related data associated with potential 
exposure to diseases, exposures, or injury conditions.   
(For additional or supporting detail, see Capability 6:  Information 
Sharing) 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
Note: Responsibility of KDHE. 
 
Skills and Training Resource Elements  
S1: (Priority) Maintain staffing capacity to manage the routine 
epidemiological investigation systems at the jurisdictional  
level as well as to support surge epidemiological investigations in 
response to natural or intentional threats or incidents.   
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
Note: While the staff was able to manage the increased 
communicable disease caseload, additional staff or training 
may have relieved much of the pressure. 
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Equipment and Technology Resource Elements  
E1: Have or have access to  jurisdictional health monitoring systems 
(electronic and/or paper, if applicable) needed to monitor health 
status , including criteria for reporting health events and 
criteria/processes  for maintaining and/or contributing to population 
health registries. 
 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
Note: EpiTrax and physical forms are available. 
E2: Have or have access to electronic databases or registries of ill, 
exposed, and potentially exposed persons; these systems  
should be capable of developing Public Health Investigation Reports 
(See Function 1: Planning Resource Element for Additional or 
Supporting Detail) as warranted, utilizing information from clinical, 
environmental, and/or forensic samples, and utilizing lab and disease 
tracking data. 
– Databases or registries should include protocols to protect 
personal health information in conformity with jurisdictional and 
federal law and via  instituting security and confidentiality 
policies (For additional or supporting detail, see Capability 6: 
Information Sharing) 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
Note: EpiTrax and AVR 
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Function 2: Conduct public health and epidemiological investigations 
Function Description: Identify the source of a case or outbreak of disease, injury, or exposure and its determinants in a population 
(e.g., time, place, person, disability status, living status, or other indices) to coordinate and report the summary results of the analysis to  
jurisdictional and federal partners, as appropriate. 
Analysis 
Strengths 
- The health department works well with community partners during investigations. (Task 1) 
- Good communication with KDHE ensures proper and timely reporting once entered into EpiTrax (Task 3). 
Areas for Improvement 
- Additional staff or overtime funding could improve investigation capabilities. Time should be allowed for review of data and 
communication among staff (Resource Element S1). 
- This exercise did not require quarantines or mandated isolation (asides from school abscences). An exercise should be prepared to 
exercise Function 2 , Task 1 in full. 
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Function 3: Recommend, monitor, and analyze mitigation actions 
Function Description: Recommend, implement, or support public health interventions that contribute to the mitigation of a threat or 
incident as well as monitor the effectiveness of the interventions. 
Task/Observation Keys Status/Task Completed 
1 Determine public health mitigation, including clinical and epidemiological management and 
actions to be recommended for the mitigation of the threat or incident based upon data 
collected in the investigation and on applicable science-based standards outlined by 
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, control of Communicable Diseases Manual, Red 
Book of Infectious Diseases or, as available, a state or CDC incident annex 
Fully  Partially  Not  N/A  
2 Provide information to public health officials to support them in decision making related to 
mitigation actions. (For additional or supporting detail, see Capability 6: Information 
Sharing) 
Fully  Partially  Not  N/A  
3 Monitor and analyze mitigation actions throughout the duration of the public health threat or 
incident.  (For additional or supporting detail, see Capability 2: Community Recovery, 
Capability 5: Fatality Management, Capability 7: Mass Care, Capability 8: Medical 
Countermeasure Dispensing, Capability 11: Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions, and 
Capability 14: Responder Safety and Health ) 
Fully  Partially  Not  N/A  
4 Recommend additional mitigation activities, based upon mitigation monitoring and analysis, 
throughout the duration of the incident, as appropriate. 
Fully  Partially  Not  N/A  
Performance Measure: Proportion of reports of selected reportable diseases for which initial 
public health control measure(s) were initiated within the appropriate time frame 
– Numerator: Number of reports of selected reportable diseases for which public health 
control measure(s) were initiated within an appropriate time frame  
– Denominator: Number of reports of selected reportable diseases received by a public 
health agency 
93.8% 
Numerator: 
__286___ 
Denominator: 
_305_ 
Status of Function 3 based on the assessments of the associated Tasks: 
 Infrastructure  Fully in Place -- Fully Evaluated and Demonstrated 
 Infrastructure  Fully in Place --Not Fully Evaluated and Demonstrated  
 Infrastructure Not Fully in Place 
 No Infrastructure in Place 
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Function 3: Recommend, monitor, and analyze mitigation actions 
Function Description: Recommend, implement, or support public health interventions that contribute to the mitigation of a threat or 
incident as well as monitor the effectiveness of the interventions. 
Planning Resource Elements Requirements met 
P1: (Priority) Written plans should include protocols for 
recommending and initiating, if indicated, containment and mitigation 
actions in response to public health incidents. Protocols include case 
and contact definitions, clinical management of potential or actual 
cases, the provision of medical countermeasures, and the process 
for exercising legal authority for disease, injury, or exposure control. 
 Protocols should include consultation with the state or territorial  
epidemiologist when warranted.  (For additional or supporting detail, 
see Capability 8: Medical Countermeasure Dispensing and 
Capability 11: Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
Note: Available through Douglas County's Disease 
Containment Guidelines as well as through various KDHE 
resources. 
P2: Written plans should include procedures for monitoring actual 
performance, and document actions and outcomes using tools such 
as data reports or statistical summaries consistent with Morbidity and 
Mortality Weekly Report and other criteria. 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
Note: State guidelines for reportable disease require certain 
criteria and performance measures be met. Specific goals and 
evaluations of performance do not appear typical. 
 
P3: Written plans should include procedures to utilize health-related 
data and statistics from programs within the jurisdictional public 
health agency to support recommendations regarding populations at-
risk for adverse outcomes during a natural or intentional threat or 
incident.  (For additional or supporting detail, see Capability 1: 
Community Preparedness) 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
 
Note: Within the Communicable Disease team, written plans 
do not exist. 
Skills and Training Resource Elements  
S1: (Priority) Public health staff participating in epidemiological 
investigations should receive awareness-level training with  
the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation After Action Report 
process. 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
Note: All staff are required to take ICS-100 and ICS-700 
courses. Though agency scorecard reports less than %60 of 
all LDCHD staff have completed these requirements. 
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Function 3: Recommend, monitor, and analyze mitigation actions 
Function Description: Recommend, implement, or support public health interventions that contribute to the mitigation of a threat or 
incident as well as monitor the effectiveness of the interventions. 
Analysis 
Strengths 
- Time to make initial contact with reported cases is very good.(Performance Measure) 
- Staff training and familiarization with the Incident Command System assists evaluation process. 
Areas for Improvement 
- Follow up on mitigation strategies and suspected cases lacks an appropriate measure. The final interview date in not appropriate as a 
measure. The final interview date and the necessity of it is heavily dependent on the duration of the cough when the patient is reported. 
The current organizational system uses physical papers and follow-up can be dependent on current case load. 
-Performance evaluations of mitigation activities might benefit the staff over time. Evaluations provide a measure of what works and 
what does not work. 
-Ensure CD team members have completed and are knowledgeable of ICS policies (Resource Element S1). 
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Function 4: Improve public health surveillance and epidemiological investigation systems 
Function Description: Assess internal agency surveillance and epidemiologic investigation both during and after an incident and 
implement quality improvement measures that are within jurisdictional public health agency control. 
Task/Observation Keys Status/Task Completed 
1 Identify issues and outcomes during and after the incident. 
 
Fully  Partially  Not  N/A  
2 Conduct post-incident/post-exercise agency evaluation meeting(s) including all active 
participants (e.g., law enforcement, volunteer agencies, clinical partners or environmental 
regulatory agency) to identify internal protocols and deficiencies that require corrective 
actions in areas such as programs, personnel, training, equipment, and organizational  
structure 
Fully  Partially  Not  N/A  
3 Develop an After Action Report/Improvement Plan. 
 
Fully  Partially  Not  N/A  
4 Communicate recommended After Action Report Improvement Plan corrective actions to 
public health leadership. 
Fully  Partially  Not  N/A  
Status of Function 1 based on the assessments of the associated Tasks: 
 Infrastructure  Fully in Place -- Fully Evaluated and Demonstrated 
 Infrastructure  Fully in Place --Not Fully Evaluated and Demonstrated  
 Infrastructure Not Fully in Place 
 No Infrastructure in Place 
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Function 4: Improve public health surveillance and epidemiological investigation systems 
Function Description: Assess internal agency surveillance and epidemiologic investigation both during and after an incident and 
implement quality improvement measures that are within jurisdictional public health agency control. 
Planning Resource Elements Requirements met 
P1: (Priority) Written plans should include procedures to 
communicate the improvement plan to key stakeholders (including 
groups representing at-risk populations) and to implement corrective 
actions identified in the improvement plan. 
 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
Note: Douglas County Bio Incident Annex - 2012 V. sections E 
and F require the completion of AAR and CAP and the 
implementation of recommendations but do not list specific 
timelines, responsibilities, or communication strategies. 
P2: Written plans should include procedures to re-engage local 
public health agencies and  key stakeholders and at-risk populations, 
as applicable, after the acute phase of a threat or incident to ensure 
that the jurisdiction’s plans and response reached all necessary 
populations. 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
Note: Not evaluated with this incident. 
 
Skills and Training Resource Elements  
S1: Public health epidemiology staff should have awareness-level 
training of quality improvement processes and techniques. 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
Note: Previous AARs and hotwashes communicate 
awareness-level training of improvement process and 
techniques. 
 
S2: Have access to individual(s) trained to meet competencies for a 
Public Health Informatician as defined in Competencies for Public 
Health Informaticians to contribute to information sourcing, use, and 
reuse for surveillance and epidemiologic analysis. 
 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
Note: KDHE 
Equipment and Technology Resource Elements  
E1: Have or have access to electronic or paper-based tools for data 
collection, management, and analysis, including methods for 
collecting, managing, and analyzing data electronically. 
 
Yes   No  Incomplete  N/A  
Note: State run reporting tool EpiTrax and AVR. Excel. An 
analyst is available at the health department. Paper based 
tools are available. 
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Function 4: Improve public health surveillance and epidemiological investigation systems 
Function Description: Assess internal agency surveillance and epidemiologic investigation both during and after an incident and 
implement quality improvement measures that are within jurisdictional public health agency control. 
Analysis 
Strengths 
- The staff has demonstrated a solid understanding of improvement methods. Close communication with KDHE helps to address reporting issues. 
The hotwash and participant feedback forms were valuable and well-received among staff. (Task 2) 
Areas for Improvement 
- The CD team did not meet on a regular basis during the outbreak. Doing so could have helped to identify issues with the investigation. (Task 1) 
- Reporting the Improvement Plan to stakeholders is not outlined. Follow through on agreed upon recommendations is not outlined. 
 
 
 
Supporting Documentation:  
 Pertussis (Whooping Cough) Investigation Guideline 
 Lawrence-Douglas County Health Department Community Disease Containment Standard Operating Guide 
 Douglas County Bio Incident Annex - 2012 
 Participant Feedback Forms - 2012 Pertussis Outbreak - Douglas County 
 Flowchart for pertussis investigations in counties with high incidence 8/7/2012 
 Incident Hotwash Notes - collected 1/29/2013 
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Attachment 3 - KDHE Case Definitions for Pertussis 
Much of the following is summarized from KDHE's Pertussis Investigation Guidelines. The full guidelines are 
available from http://www.kdheks.gov. 
Diagnosis and Reporting 
Laboratory confirmation by culture, considered the 'gold standard' is only appropriate within the first two weeks 
of cough onset. Culture has very good specificity and acceptable sensitivity when collected within two weeks. 
One can identify the strain and conduct resistance testing with isolated cultures (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, 2012). Identification of the circulating strains can be invaluable in an outbreak investigation, 
particularly if resistant strains are circulating. Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) samples must be obtained 
within 3 weeks of cough onset in vaccinated individuals. PCR testing is very sensitive but has varying 
specificity. DNA targets are not standardized among laboratories. Many labs, including KDHE (Tatti, Sparks, 
Boney, & Tondella, 2011) (Hart, 2013), test for the IS481 gene which is present in other Bordetella bacteria and 
is present with multiple copies in B. pertussis, potentially allowing for false positives (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2012). As a result, 'negative PCR tests do not rule out the possibility of pertussis.' 
(Kansas Department of Environment & Health, 2012, p. 3) Results must be interpreted on a case by case basis. 
As of January 1st, 2013, this procedure has changed. Negative laboratory tests are no longer investigated in 
Kansas without first meeting the clinical criteria. Serology tests are not appropriate for diagnostic testing in 
Kansas. Serologic assays are being developed to assist in diagnosis at later stages of the disease (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2012) (Kansas Department of Environment & Health, 2012). 
The case definitions, established by the CDC in 1997 and obtained from KDHE's Pertussis Investigation 
Guidelines (p. 2), are as follows: 
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'Clinical Description for Public Health Surveillance: A cough illness lasting > 2 
weeks with one of the following: paroxysms of coughing, inspiratory "whoop," or post-
tussive vomiting, without other apparent cause (as reported by a health professional). 
Laboratory Criteria for Case Classification: Isolation of Bordetella pertussis from 
clinical specimen; OR, Positive polymerase chain reaction (PCR) for B. pertussis.' 
Case classifications, established by the CDC and obtained from KDHE's Pertussis Investigation Guidelines (p. 
2), are as follows: 
'Confirmed: A case that is culture positive and in which an acute cough illness of any 
duration is present; OR a case that meets the clinical case definition and is confirmed by 
positive PCR; OR a case that meets the clinical case definition and is epidemiologically 
linked directly to a case confirmed by either culture or PCR. 
Probable: Meets the clinical case definition, is not laboratory confirmed, and is not 
epidemiologically linked to a laboratory-confirmed case. 
Suspect: A case, not meeting the confirmed or probable case classifications, who has a 
clinical syndrome compatible with pertussis without other apparent cause such as: cough of 
> 7 days, paroxysmal cough of any duration, cough with inspiratory whoop, cough 
associated with apnea in an infant, or cough in a close contact of pertussis case.'  
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Attachment 4: Participant Feedback Form 
The following document was provided by KDHE and used for the hotwash with the LDCHD Communicable Disease Team 
on January 29th. The form was returned by 50% of participants. 
PARTICIPANT FEEDBACK 
 
PART I: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 
 
1. Based on the incident response, list the top 3 strengths and/or areas that need improvement. 
  
  
  
  
2. Is there anything you saw in the incident response that the evaluator(s) might not have been observed or record? 
  
  
  
  
3. Identify the corrective actions that should be taken to address the issues identified above.  For each corrective action, 
indicate if it is a high, medium, or low priority.  
  
  
  
  
4. Describe the corrective actions that relate to your area of responsibility.  Who should be assigned responsibility for 
each corrective action?  
  
  
  
  
5. List the applicable equipment, training, policies, plans, and procedures that should be reviewed, revised, or 
developed.  Indicate the priority level for each. 
  
  
  
  
 
 
PART II: EVENT RESPONSE ASSESSMENT 
 
Please rate, on a scale of 1 to 5, your overall assessment of the incident relative to the statements provided below, with 1 
indicating strong disagreement with the statement and 5 indicating strong agreement. 
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Assessment Factor 
Strongly  
Disagree 
Strongly 
Agree 
The response was well structured and organized. 1 2 3 4 5 
The documentation provided during the incident was useful in 
preparing for and responding to assigned tasks. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Participation in the incident response was appropriate for 
someone in my position. 
1 2 3 4 5 
The response team included the right people in terms of level 
and mix of disciplines. 
1 2 3 4 5 
This incident response allowed my agency/jurisdiction to 
demonstrate and improve priority capabilities. 
1 2 3 4 5 
After this incident, I believe my agency/jurisdiction is better 
prepared to deal successfully with future incidents of this 
nature. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
PART III: PARTICIPANT FEEDBACK 
 
Please provide any recommendations on how this incident response or future responses could be improved or 
enhanced.  
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Attachment 5: Hotwash Notes 
Notes provided here are from the January 29th hotwash. Originally written down, they have been typed up here. 
Hotwash - 2012 Douglas County Pertussis Outbreak 
Participants present: Kathy Colson, Carolyn Ball, Shirley Grubbs 
January 29th, 8:30 a.m. 
Recorder: Mike Banfield 
Participants in event: 
 Kim Ens - Director of Clinic Services, LDCHD 
 Kathy Colson - Clinic Coordinator/Communicable Disease Nurse, LDCHD 
 Shirley Grubbs - Communicable Disease Team Leader, LDCHD 
 Carolyn Ball - Communicable Disease Nurse, LDCHD 
 Carol - Follow-up, Public Health Nurse, LDCHD 
 Ashley C. - Follow-up, Public Health Nurse, LDCHD 
 Jena Callen - Medical Investigator, KDHE 
Participating Organizations: 
 Lawrence-Douglas County Health Department 
 Kansas Department of Health and Environment 
 Douglas County Private Physicians 
 Lawrence Memorial Hospital 
 USD 497 - Lawrence Public Schools 
 USD 348 - Baldwin City Public Schools 
 USD 491 - Eudora Public Schools 
 Douglas County Day Care Facilities 
Funding Organizations: No external funding was provided. Staff was paid on the regular budget. Minimal 
additional overtime. 
Strengths: 1) Flexibility of staff and scheduling. 2) Strong working relationship with KDHE (Jena Callen, 
Medical Investigator) and school districts 3) The investigation was on a familiar disease 4) Paid close attention 
to the performance measure, initiated contact within 24 hours 5) Team works very well together despite no 
formal meetings, good working relationship 
Weaknesses: 1) No formal incident response 2) No regular meetings 3) Inconsistent data entry 4) Timely 
follow-up was lacking (as a result of case overload) 
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 Staff mentions that they frequently got caught up in workload. An EpiTrax issue proved time consuming 
as all contacts needing to be upgraded to cases required repeated data entry. 
Preparedness activities/training prior to event: 1) Contacted KDHE prior to beginning of school year 2) In 
August, a school nurse meeting was held, pertussis was discussed. Nurses were encouraged to review 
immunization records of students and staff. 3) Letters were sent to physicians regarding reporting guidelines. 
Lessons Learned from previous outbreaks: Participants in the outbreaks were more relaxed as time went on, 
did not feel responsible for spread of disease. Allowed a relationship to develop between KDHE and other 
counties. Physicians should be notified and updated of the event early on to ensure cooperation. 
Areas of Improvement: Would like to see some funding set aside for future outbreaks (e.g. overtime staffing). 
More training. Possibility of using interns to ease call load. 
Recommendations for Improvement: Improve charting consistency, use of incidence response system (ICS), 
increase staff cross training 
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Attachment 6: Other activities preformed to satisfy MPH degree requirements 
 
Action Courses Addressed 
Employment for the National Agricultural Biosecurity Center:  
Prepared documents on various zoonotic disease and have addressed the 
capabilities of various countries to address zoonotic disease outbreaks and 
biosecurity. 
-Biol 670 
-Biol 730 
-Kin 818 
-DMP 770 
-Geog 508 
-DMP 844 
-DMP 754 
-FDSCI 730 
-DMP 815 
Internship with the Lawrence Douglas County Health Department: 
Through one summer internship and one semester internship, I've completed 
over 500 hours of unpaid work for the LDCHD. Work includes the following: 
-Completed various mapping requests for information, grant applications, etc. 
-Evaluated current GIS capabilities and limitations 
-Prepared and organized GIS files for future staff use. Identified sources. 
-Identified vulnerable populations and population estimates of those groups in 
the county 
-Produced access to healthy foods maps; evaluated a model using 
convenience stores as distributors of fresh produce 
-Analysis of clinic schedule: identified time slots and days of week most 
likely to be missed, reported to Sue 
-Internal audit on clinic pregnancy procedures (were the right people being 
referred to the appropriate programs) 
-Analysis of clinic pregnancy data: patient demographics, etc. 
-Worked on a series of Health Indicator Briefs with Vince. 
-Prepared some educational materials on GIS for Vince and Charlie 
-Pertussis outbreak review 
-Biol 670 
-Kin 818 
-DMP 770 
-Geog 508 
-FDSCI  730 
-HMD 720 
-DMP 815 
-STAT 701 
-STAT 705 
-DMP 840 
-DMP 806 
-DMP 754 
Volunteer work with the Flint Hills Community Clinic: 
Work as a CNA and Greeter 
-KIN 818 
Volunteer for the Riley County Health Department Flu Vaccination Clinic: 
Worked several dates checking people in for vaccinations. 
-DMP 754 
-KIN 818 
-BIOL 670 
KSU Graduate Student Council Health Insurance Representative: 
Work includes attending GSC meetings and relaying changes to the graduate 
health insurance to the council. Also responsible for setting up webinars and 
meetings. Addressing student concerns should they exist. 
-HMD 720 
-KIN 818 
 
 
 
